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ABSTRACT
Title of Thesis: THE OPERATIONAL UTILITY OF THE
WALTON-McKERSIE ATTITUDINAL STRUCTURING
MODEL IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Thesis directed by: Professor J. Rigassio

This work is an heuristic inquiry into behavioral
change theory designed for application to labor/management
interaction in collective bargaining. The theory itself
was postulated by Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie
in their book A Behavioral Theory Of Labor Negotiations.
The principles of their theory are highly axiomatic and
their importance and validity can only be recognized
through applied empirical analyses that demonstrate or
refute its concept.
The aspect of the theory which is the focal point of
this research pertains to the structuring and restructuring of attitudes and attendant relationships resulting
from the collective bargaining process. The objective of
this work is twofold. First, the analytical utility of the
theory is examined by applying its tenets to an analysis of
the behavioral strategies and tactics used by the respective
labor and management operatives in the 1981 Professional Air
Traffic Controllers Organization strike. Second, the consistency of the theory and model with current knowledge and

research in the field is examined; also how that knowledge
and research enhances the Walton-McKersie analysis is discussed.
Case study methodology is used to illustrate the thesis
concept because any empirical study that examines the validity and practicality of a theory has added value when it is
done within the realm of that given discipline. Also, absolute studies best illustrate the trends by which researchers and practitioners approach problems in their fields and
help to possibly clarify those approaches.
From this study it is concluded that the Walton-McKersie
attitudinal structuring model offers the most elucidative
classification of relationships and behaviors descriptive
of the negotiating process of all materials researched. It
can be applied in collective bargaining interactions to reduce behavioral uncertainties. However, to improve the
model's operational utility as a motivational, predictive,
and informational tool, additional research and study is
required in the following areas. First, as shown in the case
study example, humans do not always use probability information effectively; sometimes they ignore it. The probability of a confrontation and the attendant consequences
were made clear to all operatives in the Professional Air
Traffic Controllers Organization(PATCO) strike, however,
shattering consequences for both sides were not avoided.
Additional study and research on how collective bargaining
processes are affected by varying political, economic,

intra-organizational and inter-organizational policies,
and social climates will enhance the operational utility
of the Walton-McKersie model. Second, the implication
interpretable from the above probability of occurrence
example is that people, and the organizations that they
comprise, estimate the probability of single occurrences
more adequately than aggregate probabilities of occurrence, and that the strategies often adopted as a result,
are not optimal. Research on how objective probabilities and payoff values (based on past bargaining
profiles and current information) can be applied to
the Walton-McKersie concepts will allow for simulation
and decision theory type analysis of negotiating processes, thus improving the model's predictive utility.
Finally, it is suggested in the thesis that goals
rather than attitudes be the focal point of behavioral
change models related to negotiations. Additional
research on the motivational qualities of goal setting in bargaining activities will help in the understanding of how goals and behaviors are linked.
The developmental implication of all the above
is to move towards a more useful and analytical model
of collective bargaining processes.

PREFACE

This research effort is directed at examining an
integral part of the collective bargaining experience known
as labor negotiations. Two professors, Richard E. Walton
and Robert B. McKersie, formulated a comprehensive behavioral change model to explore "how" and "why" parties engaged
in negotiations tend to behave. Also, a taxonomy to classify
the behaviors was developed to add some rationality to the
study and communication of research in the area.
The value of their work is evidenced by repeated reference to their theory in materials researched that were
published domestically, as well as abroad.
The behavioral change model for negotiations that
Walton and McKersie developed was designed to be an aid in
the study and practice of collective bargaining. To
evaluate rationally the behavioral aspects of collective
bargaining can only help to impact positively on key decisions made by those party to the process. Of all the models
reviewed, the Walton-McKersie model was the one that explored labor negotiating in the context of a broad range of
interactive conditions associated with the process.
Further study to enhance their model as an appropriate
informational tool in labor negotiations can be essential
to the success of future labor relations. By assisting in
identifying and dealing with the uncertainties of labor
negotiations, behavioral modeling can become a powerful

tool for both educators and practitioners in the labor
relations field. Two of the studies included in the thesis
deal with quantifying and measuring behavioral models. In
this light, by invoking the power of the computer, there is
promise that this complex area of study can become manageable
and more representative of the collective bargaining experience. Quantitative applications and computer-aided
modeling will also aid in compiling, analyzing, and applying
the masses of data required in researching such an area.
Behavioral modeling, whether used for analyzing
one-time situations or as an integral part of one's planning system, can be of value for considering the desirability
of alternative collective bargaining decisions. In evaluating specific bargaining situations for example, changes in
political, economic, and enterprise policies can be assessed
in terms of choosing a particular bargaining strategy.
More generalized models can be used on a continuing basis
relative to long range labor relations planning, desirability between collective bargaining strategies, labor
negotiations simulation, etc.
Recognizing the potential for all of the above, and
the commitment to behavioral modeling development, can only
heighten the capabilities of labor relations and its impact
on America's systems of service and manufacture.
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SECTION I.
THE LEGISLATED OBJECTIVE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AND EVOLVED BEHAVIORAL RELATIONS

The association between labor and management is symbiotic in nature. There are distinct self interests, as
well as common interests for both that make their association necessary. A fundamental precept prescribed by law
to govern such relationships is collective bargaining.
In the macro context of the Labor Management Relations
Act representatives of labor, management, and government are
the primary operatives in collective bargaining. All
interact in the process to attempt transformations of differences into compromises that maximize the vested interests
of each party. Operatives within a given system of service
or manufacture are responsible to reach agreement on matters
of discord. Collective bargaining is looked upon as the
foundation of dispute settlement in the United States. It
is one of the primary forces for resolving discord between
various human resource factions within a given enterprise.
The institution of collective bargaining is deeply
embedded in America's systems of service and manufacture.
It has been, and is, a preeminent force shaping the attitudes and actions of labor and management alike. It has
evolved into a system organized around the resolution of
antithetic interests. The process itself was designed to
transform those differences into compromises which set the
-1-

-2tone of labor-management relations.
Collective bargaining permeates many key areas of our
systems of service and manufacture. Although many employees
in the various segments of the workforce are not covered by
collective bargaining agreements, it cannot be denied that
the institution greatly influence them. Por example,
systems of service and manufacture whose employees are not
organized generally remain that way by matching the gains
achieved through collective bargaining in systems that are
organized. This tendency is prevalent even within a given
system that have both organized and unorganized sectors in
1
their workforce.
The processes of collective bargaining are, complex.
Its utility can be enhanced only to the extent that the
multifaceted dynamics of its operation are understood.
Bargaining which consciously takes advantage of every possible opportunity rather than constrain itself to traditional areas of gain can only serve to yield a net improvement
in intra-business and inter-business labor relations. If
the opportunities go unheeded, bargaining success potential
will continue to be impeded and any long term relations
improvement will be in jeopardy. This consideration is becoming more significant because of evolving tendencies of
both blue-collar and white-collar employees to initiate some
form of organization. Also, because foreign competition and
1 Helfgott, R.B., Labor Economics. New York: Random House,
Inc., 1980, pp. 79-268.
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world markets demand that assaults on all fronts for productivity improvement be considered.
Historically, the primary focus of operatives(comprised of labor, management, and government) in the collective bargaining process has been on economic issues, work
rules, work conditions, and the rights and obligations of
each operative when they interact with one another. The
need for greater efficiency and productivity brought about
by inexorable and stern competition, coupled with keen consumer awareness of and demand for quality, make it imperative that opportunity in related, but not necessarily antithetic areas of interest, be recognized. Examples of such
areas are organizational development, industrial relations,
and industrial psychology, all of which are part of human
resource management. One such opportunity exemplified in
recent bargaining activity is that of attitude change. 2
Attitude change or attitudinal structuring as defined by
Richard E. Walton and Robert B, McKersie is the designed
alteration and/or maintenance of desired behavioral patterns
amongst interacting operatives. Walton and McKersie postulate that collective bargaining is an excellent mechanism
to facilitate such structuring(this assertion will be addressed later).
It becomes very clear after researching the collective
2 This is a reference to recent trends toward concession bargaining in the auto industry. Historically, concession
bargaining was non-existent. Recent bargaining strategy reprea major change in attitude.

bargaining experience that there are some conflicts which
are beneficial and others that are not; some lead to disintegration and harm; some lead to resolution and cooperation. The spirit of this analysis is consistent with these
themes. However, the focal point is on attitude change
theory, behavior modification, and coterminous goal setting
in labor negotiations. There are several characteristics of
collective bargaining which heighten the attitudinal dimension: (1) the issues themselves often involve human values,
and how they are handled affects the overall relationship
(2) the strategies and tactics chosen often involve sanctions
which can exert a strong influence on the tone of the relationship (3) negotiation of the agreement represents only
the beginning of the transaction and (4) whether or not the
terms of the agreement are fulfilled depends upon the
character of the relationship. Moreover, the relationship
between the parties to labor negotiations is usually
unique, continuing, and long term; the attitudinal dimension
providing one means by which the successive negotiations are
linked. 3
From the above discussion of collective bargaining
affectivities, its universality can be sensed. Also, one
can begin to appreciate the importance and potential of
behavioral theory as it relates to the collective bargaining
process as a vehicle for change.
3 Walton, R.E. and McKersie, R.B., A Behavioral Theory Of
Labor Negotiations. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
1965.

SECTION II.
THE THESIS CONCEPT

Collective bargaining, as it has evolved in the United
States, involves tactical behavioral processes. In tactical
negotiating processes, operatives of labor and management do
necessarily change their attendant stimuli and response behaviors as a function of past bargaining experience and respective organizational goals. Roles of aggressor or respondent, and bargaining leverage relative to each other are
critical to their interaction. Recognizing this, the
interaction between representatives of employees and employers
for wages, benefits, and other terms and conditions of
employment is an extensive area of study among behavioral
scientists.
The thesis objective was to examine how the WaltonMcKersie model of behavioral change in labor negotiations
could be enhanced as a working model by integrating its
propositions with findings from behavioral science research.
Then, by use of a relevant case study, tenets of the integrated product were explored.
Many of the complexities in the systems of relations
associated with collective bargaining have been represented
in behavioral models and/or experiments. Some of the models
and experiments rest heavily on "systems" theory concepts.
Others are geared towards individual behavior analysis and
group behavior analysis. Generally, the studies and models
-5-
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found in current literature relevant to the thesis analysis
fell into one of the following categories:
a) those which attempt to encompass the system of relationships between operatives in collective bargaining, as well as the "environment" in which those
system of relationships exist.
b) those which explore cognitive and motivational
"dynamics" of individuals in their interpersonal
relations.
c) those which focus on situational factors present
in a given "task" assignment and the identification
of satisfaction and the performance thereof.
It should be noted that categories b) and c) are sub-sets or
subprocesses of category a), as the systems oriented models
generally attempt to capture the essential concepts examined
in categories b) and c).
The materials researched contained numerous theories
and studies that relate well to the concepts presented in
the Walton-McKersie model. The theories and studies included for discussion in the thesis were selected primarily because the attendant concepts and propositions for each
furnished the needed elements that enhance the understanding
and operational utility of the Walton-McKersie model. Each
of the theories/studies are discussed in the following
pages and summarized below.
The valence-expectancy theory set forth by Victor H.
Vroom was included because it examines and integrates
concepts of individual goals with the perceived probability
that the goals are attainable. The goals, coupled with the
perceived probability of attainment of the same, is what
Vroom suggests is the motivating force that guide individual

actions. These concepts correlate well with the WaltonMcKersie discussion of what motivates attitude and behavioral change in labor negotiations.
The behavioral study by Susan E. Jackson and Sheldon
Zedeck concerning how goals, task characteristics, and
evaluative contexts effect individual and group behavior
variability was found to be important in analyzing the
Walton-McKersie model because its findings are relevant to
such factors as peer pressure, temporal constraints, and
motivation relative to "task characteristics, all of which
are important elements in the study of negotiating behaviors.
The empirical analysis by Charles K. Parsons and
Charles L. Hulin was referenced because of its quantitative
modeling technique for measuring dimensions of job satisfaction. Its relevance to the thesis analysis of the
Walton-McKersie model is the concept that attitudes and
goal identification are "measurable" through quantitative
analyses utilizing the techniques they present.
Finally, the decision theory approach to measuring
behavioral propensity towards achievement, power, and
affiliation was investigated. This theory helps one
understand tenets of the Walton-McKersie model that relate
to the thesis concept of coterminous goal setting, even
in light of recognized differences between labor, management, and government.

SECTION III.
INTRODUCTION TO THE WALTON-McKERSIE MODEL

The attitudinal structuring model provides a systematic behavioral approach for examining and analyzing
the creation and/or maintenance of preferred bargaining
relationships. Its foundation is rooted in balance theory.
Essentially, balance theory in the context of collective
bargaining would purport that operatives prefer consistency or balance among their cognitions of how each are
expected to act, with a tendency to hold feelings towards
each other and beliefs about each other that are congruent.
The point being that each will tend to eliminate cognitive
inconsistencies, as there is an apparent psychological cost
associated with discrepant cognitions, and hence there will
be a strain toward balance. The strain towards balance
presents an influence opportunity. This opportunity is
taken advantage of by the introduction of a new and/or
discrepant cognition(s) into the target operatives' awareness(an act, association or other behavior that is inconsistent to existing cognitions or beliefs held by the
target operative), thereby creating forces towards attitude
modification to alleviate cognitive imbalance. It is
surmised that a change in the target operative's attitude
will be followed by an attendant change in behavior. 4
4 Walton and McKersie, op. cit., pp. 209-219.
-8-

Figure 1. schematically shows interacting factors and
activities relating to the Walton-McKersie attitudinal
atructuring model. The model depicts developing or established relationship patterns as being influenced by
structural variables. These include (1) environmental or
contextual factors- regulatory, economic, political, technological, etc. (2) operatives characterizationconservatism, militancy, Boulwarism, etc. and (3) mutually convergent and/or divergent mores, beliefs, etc. These factors
(arrows 1,2,3) influence the actions of all operatives,
which in turn influence and structure an attitude posture
for each in the bargaining process. Arrow 4 represents
the strategy each operative adopts for the bargaining
process to attain a desired effect for achieving their
respective goal(s). The adopted strategy is usually
predicated on previous historical negotiating encounters
and developed according to those outcomes. Arrow 5 represents the resultant attitude posture of each operative
effectuated in the bargaining process. Once these emergent
attitudes and/or behaviors are established, operatives
will attempt to influence (arrow 6) the structural variables shown in (A) according to their implication or
functional consequence for each operative. Examples of
this are political lobbying, awareness campaigning, public sentiment arousal, and coalition bargaining. Once
this reiterative loop is exhausted, the consequence for
the operatives manifests itself (arrow 7).

FIGURE 1, - Interacting Factors Depicted In The Walton-McKersie Model

Arrows 1,2,3,5, and 6 represent the reiterative loop
of activity that outlines the collective bargaining process.
The model transcends any temporal constraints and may represent immediate, interim, or successive structuring activity.
Arrows 4,7, and 8 represent the manifestations of bargaining activity and the deliberate attempt to maintain or
alter those manifestations. Stated more simply:.
If the manifested consequence and attendant employment
relationship are not regarded as optimal by respective
operatives during and/or after the negotiating process,
purposive intervention (arrow 8) will be made to alter
the relationship so as to minimize a loss in negotiating leverage and to maximize all potential gains in
negotiating leverage. 5
The model also asserts that operatives of collective
bargaining share a relationship pattern, These are classified in the model as (1) conflict, (2)
containment-aggression, (3) accomodation, (4) cooperation, (5) collusion.
Additionally, the model assumes that operatives have (1)
certain motivational orientations and action tendencies
toward each other (competitive, individualistic, cooperative) (2) beliefs about the other's commitment (3) feelings
of trust or the lack thereof toward one another, and (4)
feelings of either friendliness or hostility toward one
another.
A conflict relationship pattern is mostly characterized by extremely adamant and competitive postures when
operatives interact. Sincerity about one another's ends
5 Walton and McKersie, op. cit., pp. 208-221.
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and means are often challenged. Recognition and dealings
with one another are mainly limited to that required by
law and mutual interest. Operatives view their relationship as one not of choice but one necessary to satisfy
their respective organizational goals. Positive concern
and interaction is practically non-existent; in some instances operatives may be inclined to contribute to the
demise of the other's representatives and/or their organization as a whole. Animosity and distrust are accepted
ways of life in this type of relationship.
A relationship pattern characterized as containmentaggression is moderately competitive. Sincerity about
one another's ends and means is accepted to a greater
degree than in a conflict relationship pattern. Operatives
try to constantly extend their scope of influence and
contain the same for the. other. In this pattern, operatives
would not only be interested in gaining the loyalty of each
other's constituents, but also in detracting from the
loyalty that exists within the other's realm. Boulwarism
and. Crawfordism are well known worker-employer relations
that fit this category. 6
In a relationship pattern of accomodation operatives
demonstrate an individualistic motivational orientation.
They more or less accept the status quo with little or no
drive to change the nature of their interaction.
6

McMurry, R.N., "War And Peace In Labor Relations", Harvard
Business Review, vol. 30, December, 1955, pp. 48-60.

-13In the cooperative relationship pattern operative
interaction is characterized by willingness by each to
coterminously pursue enterprise goals in such a way that
all involved derive benefits from accomplishing those
goals. Mutual trust and friendliness is prevalent in this
kind of relationship.
A relationship pattern that is defined as one of

collusion involves activities by operatives which fall
outside of the law. The operatives involved form a coalition to pursue common goals that are not really in the
valued interest of the constituents they represent. It
is a relationship designed to exploit some third party;
sometimes within, and sometimes out of the letter of the
law. These five relationship patterns are summarized in
Figure 2.
The explicit and implicit propositions Walton and
McKersie offer as a result of their treatment of behavioral theory in labor negotiations are: (1) that a link
exists between bargaining goals and behavior; and that
the behaviors often serve as indices for inferring whether or not goal conflict or perceived goal conflict exists
in the relationship and conversely, that the knowledge
that basic goals are in conflict becomes the basis for
predicting the class of behavior identified in their taxonomy (2) that the behaviors Walton and McKersie designate
as tactics for modification in attitudinal structuring
double as indicators of the degree of concern about the

ATTITUDINAL
DIMENSIONS
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PATTERN OF RELATIONSHIP
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Cooperation
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Motivational
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FIGURE 2. - Attitudinal Components Of The Relationship Patterns

Source: Walton and McKersie
Op. cit., p. 189.
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maintenance or the desire to change the existing relationship pattern as well as give an indication of the direction of that change(friendliness/trust, animosity/
distrust) (3) that opportunity exists in the bargaining
process to influence the relationship between operatives;
in particular such attitudes as friendliness-hostility,
trust, respect, and the motivational orientation of competitiveness or cooperation.

A. "Systems" Concepts Relevant To The Thesis Analysis Of
The Walton-McKersie Model
Collective bargaining is a legislated abstraction
which advocates a basic practice and procedure to be used
to minimize and/or eliminate "...obstructions to the free
flow of commerce..." 7 The legislation8 . does not explicit-,
ly define what is meant by the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining, and any real interpretative working definition comprehensive enough to encompass the
multiplicity of factors inherent to it would be awkward and
abstruse. Even though there is no attempt to define
collective bargaining, and examination of certain characteristics inherent to it can be made without loss, as
we all apperceive, to some degree, the nature of collective
'Title I - Amendments Of National Labor Relations Act, 1947.
Section 101, Findings And Policies - Section 1.
8 Text of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as
amended by Public Laws 86-257, 1959 and 93-360, 1974,
(Public Law 101-80th Congress)
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bargaining.
Dunlop's theory of industrial relations systems 9
provides the framework on which the thesis concept is
predicated. In all-encompassing terms, John T. Dunlop
states:
An industrial relations system at any one time in its
development is regarded as comprised of certain actors,
certain contexts, an ideology which binds the industrial relations system together, and a body of rules
created to govern the actors at the work place and work
community.
The actors are: (1) a hierarchy of managers and their
representatives in supervision (2) a hierarchy of
workers(non-managerial) and any spokesman and (3)
specialized governmental agencies(and specialized
private agencies created by the first two, actors)
concerned with workers, enterprises, and their relationship.
So defined, and accepting its premises, this systems concept can be applied to the institution of collective bargaining. Simply stated the above means that every enterprise(its functioning) has a purpose. All operatives
within a system interact, and each operative has an effect
on the other and on the system as a whole. A subtle abstraction here is that collective bargaining, in a systems
context, serves as a mandated interface for operatives to
transform discord affecting the goals of national commerce,
into compromises. Figure 3. shows primary factions and
goals at work in the collective bargaining sphere.
The assumptions listed in Table 1-1 highlight key
premises underlying Dunlop's theory as they pertain to
9 Dunlop, John T., Industrial Relations Systems. New York
Henry Holt and Company, 1958.

FIGURE 3. - Sphere Of Collective Bargaining

TABLE 1-1

ASSUMPTIONS FOR SYSTEMS APPLICATION IN
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

1.

In a systems context, collective bargaining processes
form an interactive network amongst operatives - labor,
management, and government - which is organized in distinctive ways and ultimately governed by overall system requirements.

2.

Operatives of collective bargaining processes necessarily interact with and affect each other as well as composite systems of economy and commerce as a whole.

3.

As a legislated entity, collective bargaining has a
defined purpose to govern employment relations as they
relate to and effect systems of economy and commerce.

4.

Collective bargaining processes take place in varying
political, economic, and social climates and are affectby changes occurring in these dimensions.

collective bargaining.
The Walton-McKersie model assumes attitudinal
change can be either conscious or intuitive and that it
is a rational and interactive process. However, behavioral analysis in the systems context introduces
certain constraints that must be addressed. As Dunlop
suggests, there is a hierarchy of goals, functions, and
relationships in any system. Subsystems and subprocesses are ultimately affected by overall system goals.
This implies that since operatives and their interaction are subsets of the collective bargaining char10
ter, charter goals will ultimately weigh more importantly than operative goals in a bargaining stalemate.
This hierarchy of goals, functions, and relationships
is shown in Figure 4. The interaction between different
goal levels is of obvious interest because it has consequences for overall system effectiveness. Various
elements may be wholly or partly dependent on inputs
from a given level or may be independent of inputs
from other levels. It can be deduced that dependent
goal level systems have greater potential for dysfunction(in this analysis this would mean the propensity for strikes, lockouts, job-actions, etc.).
Collective bargaining can therefore be viewed as
10 Twomey, David P., Labor Law & Legislation., Ohio: Southwestern Publishing Company, 1980, pp. 108-109.
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FIGURE 4. - Hierarchy Of Goals, Relationships, And Functions
In The Systems Context Of Collective Bargaining
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the mechanism for self-regulation of interaction between operatives in an ongoing effort to achieve its
goal of minimizing obstructions to the free flow of
commerce. Its most useful role, accepting the premise
that the goals of national commerce have primacy over
enterprise goals, is to provide feedback critical to
effective self-regulation. Operative and system history is therefore important in understanding system
behaviors as behaviors are the elements that fuel and
11
This
direct the system in achieving its goals.
sets the analytical framework under which this treatment of attitudinal structuring is made.

B. Discussion Of The Im lications Of S stems Theor
Relative To The Walton-McKersie Model
The focus of the Walton-McKersie analysis relating to attitude change is singularly directed and the
relavancy of operative attitude in the systems context
is not addressed. This was a self imposed constraint
and simplification by Walton and McKersie. For purposes of giving focus to their analysis, the negotiator of respective operatives was the target of attitude change efforts in the model. Walton and McKersie recognized that for change to occur in the
11 Berelson, B. and Steiner, G.A., Human Behavior: An
Inventory Of Scientific Findings.,NYorek:w
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1964, p. 240.
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institutional relationships of collective bargaining,
it had to go beyond the negotiators to include their
constituents as well. Also, they felt that by changing the attitudes and behaviors of representatives of
labor and management the desired chain reaction would
result. Another reason stated for the singularly directed analysis was that they felt that the negotiator's
attitudes were the more "accessible" attitudes for change
in the organization. However, for an operational
model, consideration must also be given to the contextual or systems factors noted in the schematic diagram
of the Walton-McKersie model in Figure 1.
The enterprise, which is a subset of a national
system of commerce, is defined by its charter. A
charter or mission is what gives the enterprise its
purposive nature. The charter is a precondition that
establishes a requisite hierarchy of subordination.
Simply stated, a requisite hierarchy of subordination
is the acceptance of given enterprise needs or requirements to fulfill the responsibilities of its charter.
Inherent to this pursuit are also responsibilities
to various enterprise integrants 12 to the extent that
those responsibilities foster interdependency for
continuity, effectiveness, and the development of an
12

Integrant as used here is descriptive of aggregated
human resources within the confines of a defined
organizational unit(hierarchy of managers and their
representatives, hierarchy of organized labor, and
specified governmental agencies).

-23internal climate in which enterprise goals can be met.
The enterprise charter often attenuates individuality
forcing integrants into a controlled mold. In this
context, integrant purpose ranks lower in the hierarchy
of requisite subordination than composite purpose. The
attitude and behavior of integrants of labor, management,
and government are therefore not always coterminous in the
bargaining process. When respective operatives are em-

bedded as they are in the aggregate system of commerce,
many factors dictate and affect behavior and should not
be analyzed individually. To that extent the WaltonMcKersie attitudinal structuring model is somewhat misguided on the relative import of operative attitude
change. Attitudes are of concern but it is recognized
that they reflect inherent personal sensitivities that
are difficult to change. Berelson and Steiner have found
that given consistent support from historical, federal,
group, and social forces, attitudes and beliefs are un-

likely to change with any degree of permanence. 13
Parsons and Hulin have noted in their work 14 that behavioral modeling of indeterminate systems that are
multi-dimensional in nature is complex and transcends

13 Berelson, B. and Steiner, G.A., op. cit. pp. 575-585.

14 Parsons, C.K. and Hulin, C.L., An Empirical Comparison
._ Of Item Response Theory & Hierarchial Factor Analysis In Applications To The Measurement Of Job
Satisfaction, Journal of Applied Psychology, vol.
67, December, 1982, pp. 826-834.
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simple cause-and-effect analyses. Also, in highly indeterminate circumstances such as a bargaining session, it
has been found that behavioral response action to one's
own actions are easily misinterpreted. 15 Indeterminacy, and
its uniqueness in any given bargaining circumstance, greatly
reduces the ability and accuracy to predict from measures
of past histories. The system of relations that exist in
the collective bargaining process are dynamic; inputs to
the process from operatives vary not only in terms of their
own organizational posture and goals but also with respect
to each other's organizational posture and goals(interorganizational/intraorganizational). This dynamic characteristic would prove the attitudinal structuring model
16
unreliable as a prognostic tool. Behavioral studies
supporting the thesis position indicate that patterning or
17 of behavior in varying
structuring improves anticipation
15 Journal of Experimental Psychology, vol. 49, 1955,
PP. 343-351.
16 Jackson, S.E. and Zedeck, S., Explaining Performance
Variabilit : Contributions Of Goal Setting: Task
Characteristics, And Evaluative Contexts, Journal Of
Applied Psychology, vol. 67, December, 1982, pp.
343-351.
Frost, P.J. and Mahoney, T.A., Goal Setting And The Task
Process: An Interactive Influence On Individual
Performance, Organizational Behavior And Human
Performance, vol. 17, 1976, pp. 323-350.
17

Anticipation is used here in the sense to look for as
proper with a foretaste of attendant pleasantness or
distress, whichever the case may be. Whereas predictive is used in the sense of having a considerable degree
of confidence to foretell occurrences.
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degrees and that patterned tasks, whether cognitive or
manual, are conducive to reducing uncertainty. However,
more study and research on how to quantify the aforementioned elements of the bargaining process would be required to
improve the predictive utility of the Walton-McKersie model.
As it exists, the structuring activities tend toward ehhancement of perceptual anticipation, and in a like manner,
anticipatory responding in the bargaining process. One
can also premise that attitude structuring and its effect
loses import over time if constituents and goals of respective operatives remain the same because redundancy
associated with their interaction will enable them to
better deal with attitudinal uncertainty at the bargaining
table. So it can be concluded that the predictive utility
of the Walton-McKersie model in an operational context
would be inhibited by indeterminacy and lack of "reality
18
contact".
It would be like extending solutions that were
worked out for a zero-sum type game and applying them
illegitimately to a non-zero-sum type situation. Also
there is a degree of internal inconsistency in the WaltonMcKersie theory. A basic assumption stated is that operatives wish to modify attitudes in the direction of more
trust, friendliness, and cooperation, or at least maintain
the existing level of the same in their current relationship. The mechanism they suggest, cognitive instability,
18 Mahoney, M.J., Cognition And Behavior Modification,
Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 974,
P. 54.
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to motivate attitude change militates against cooperative
behavior in favor of competitive behavior. Bem and Abel19
address the idea of cognitive instability as a
son
motivator for attitude change, with Bem stating:
Inconsistency, they seem to be trying to tell us,
motivates belief and attitude change. But I don't
believe it. At least not very much. In my view, a
vision of inconsistency as a temporary turbulence in
an otherwise fastidious pool of cognitive clarity is
all too misleading. My own suspicion is that inconsistency is probably our most enduring cognitive
commonplace. That is, I suspect that for most of
the people some of the time inconsistency just sits
there... I believe in short, that there is more inconsistency on earth (and probably in heaven) than
is dreamt of in our psychological theories.
As such, consistency among beliefs or between attitudes and
behavior is an acculturated characteristic, not an inborn
20
circuit that can be switched off and on.
In general then, the model is extremely informational
by setting forth an analytical framework to characterize
relationships in the negotiating process. However, the
focal point for change should be goals more than attitudes.
To capitalize fully on the enterprise's human resource,
an understanding and commitment to enterprise goals is
required by respective operatives. Refocusing modification effort to goals rather than attitudes for more coterminally oriented and lasting benefit is the better
19

Ibid., p. 222.

20Ibid., p. 230.
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approach. Hackman and Lawler 21 have suggested that behavior is related to the perceived probability that good
performance will lead to valued recognition. In collective
bargaining, performance is valued to the extent that it
satisfies enterprise requirements. When operatives satisfy their respective needs concomitantly while working
towards enterprise goals(total system of commerce or a
sub-set thereof), they enhance their standing as an asset
to the enterprise. As noted in the recent survey by the
22
Chamber of Commerce of The United States, a majority
of people will value the opportunity to satisfy higherorder enterprise needs(requisite subordination). This
should be qualified by stating these higher-order needs
are satisfied to the extent that the involved individuals
see that they are personally responsible for accomplishing a worthwhile, meaningful task.
As Vroom has suggested, the strength of motivation
for certain behaviors is a multiplicative function of
the expectancy that the behavior will lead to certain
outcomes and the reward value of the outcomes attain21 Hackman, J.R. and Lawler, LE., Employee Reactions To
Job Characteristic, Monograph, Journal of Applied
Psychology, vol. 55, 1971, pp. 259 plus.
22 Chamber of Commerce of The United States, Workers'
Attitude Toward Productivity: A New Survey, Library
Dress Catalogue Card No. 80-67158, 1980.
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ed. As such, bargaining goals that are set recognizing collective human resource sensitivities are more
likely to enhance, not change, individual motives like
achievement and self-actualization, and to generate among
individuals who have those motives aroused, the belief
that successful performance will result in improved feelings
of achievement and growth. 24 As Walton and MeKersie have
suggested, collective bargaining is an excellent medium
for executing and propagating these ideas.

C. Informational And Analytical Utility Of The WaltonMcKersie Model In The Systems

Context Of Collective

Bargaining
The Walton-McKersie attitude structuring model offers
the most pervasive taxonomy of relationships and behaviors
descriptive of the negotiating process of all materials
researched. It is important because it offers a framework and behavioral classification of negotiating strategies and tactics which are fundamental to any comprehensive
review of a given subject. This is true because the
23 Vroom, V.H., Work and Motivation., New York: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. 1964. Ideas stated are adopted from
Vroom's valence-expectancy theory.
Wahba, M.A. and House, R.J., Expectancy Theory In Work And
Motivation: Some Logical And Methodological Issues.,
Human Relations, vol. 27, 1974, pp. 121-147
24 Lawler, E.E., Job Design And Employee Motivation.,
Personnel Psychology, vol. 22, 1969, p. 429.

aforementioned allows practitioners and researchers to
communicate findings and experiences within a common frame
of reference. Throughout many materials researched, the
Walton-McKersie taxonomy and descriptions kept reappearing.
This indicates a degree of acceptance and universality of
their work in the field and a commonality of thought, to
which some extent validates both empirical and theoretical
treatments they make of the subject.
Their concepts of negotiating behaviors and operative
functioning have helped others to understand, and perhaps
apply their theory in the real world. Their work shows (1)
behaviors that tend to be present in the negotiating
process (2) behaviors, functioning, or processes presumably required to improve relationships that result
from collective bargaining (3) perceptions operatives must
have to optimize their interaction and (4) characteristics
of the collective bargaining process in terms of its
stimulus and response properties. Levine 25 has demonstrated the utility of classification schemes in behavioral
research. In general, the specific taxonomy presented by
Walton and McKersie has analytical value that is practical
and apparently in use in the field.
Figure 6. depicts a schematic representation of an
25Levine, J.M., Evaluation Of An Abilities Classification
System For Integrating And Generalizing Human
Performance Research Findings: An Application To
Vigilance Tasks, Journal of Applied Psychology, 1973,
vol. 58, pp. 149-157.
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FIGURE 6. - Schematic Representation Of An Industrial
Relations System. (see footnote 26.)

-32-

industrial relations system.

26

Accepting the thesis

premise that attitude structuring should be refocused to
goal adjustment in the negotiating process and that the
analytical and informational properties of the WaltonMcKersie model can be better served as such, the, feedback
(information) loop in Figure 6, will be discussed.
Collective bargaining is the part of the feedback
loop that pertains to labor negotiations and the emergent
relations between labor, management, and government. It
is the legislated mechanism that allows the system of
relations to regulate itself and provides various types
of information/intellegience(goals, attitude, consequence
of behavior, etc.) indicated in the attitudinal structuring model. This information has utility in guiding,
enhancing, and making the sensitivities of respective
operatives apparent in negotiating and improves the chances
for a fruitful collective agreement that is coterminous
with enterprise goals. In regulating interaction (collectively, and on a individual basis as well) an evaluative
process takes place by each operative as Walton and McKersie
suggests. However, in the systems context, modification
of goals, rather than attitudes, is of primacy so as to
bring them into accord with system criteria. As Figure
6. depicts, feedback is an ongoing process, and without
26 Stephenson, G.M. and Brotherton, C.J., Industrial
Relations: A Social Psychological Approach.,
New York:. John Wiley & Sons, 1979, p. 17.
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it measurement, evaluation, and modification is imprecise.
When the attitudinal structuring model is viewed as
a feedback mechanism its informational utility becomes
27 lends support to the
apparent. Work by Locke and Bryan
thesis statement that the model to a lesser degree has
motivational properties and to a greater degree informational value. They suggest that feedback should specifically direct on to the nature of his or her error(s),
and show how those errors might be corrected. Otherwise,
the feedback will tend to be used imprecisely by those to
which it is directed with little or no relation to the
intended value. For instance, having knowledge of a
total score on a test given over a period of time can
tell a student whether or not he or she passed or failed,
but it would not tell the student specifically areas of
strength or weakness. If the intent was to instruct s.o
that one might improve, the locus of inadequate performance
must be clear. As in the attitudinal structuring model,
introduction of a cognitive discrepancy into an operative's
awareness is a form of imprecise feedback. It is a signal of dissatisfaction and that a change is desired, but
it does not indicate the source of dissatisfaction or
what behavioral changes are desired. As such, imprecise
feedback lacks cue value and it is considered to be less
27 Locke, E.A. and Bryan, J.F., Knowledge Of Score And Goal
Level As Determinants Of Work Rate, Journal of
Applied Psychology, 1969, vol. 53, pp. 59-65.
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adequate than feedback that is specific. A recent laboratory experiment by Jackson and Zedeck 28 suggest the
operational utility of informational feedback. Results
from their experiment indicate that feedback that signifies
inadequate or superior performance will result in goal
changes. In the inadequate performance condition, goals
tended to be adjusted to increase levels of effort. In
the superior performance condition, goals tended to be
adjusted to maintain or decrease levels of effort. The
implications of these findings as they relate to the
Walton-McKersie model is that (1) goal adjustment is likely to be amore. fruitful target for modification in labor
negotiations, and (2) coterminous goal setting is more
likely to positively affect emergent relationship patterns
resulting from collective bargaining by serving to cue
operatives towards cooperative behaviors such as generating,
trying, and implementing new strategies. 29 Unlike the
balance theory foundation which is the cornerstone of the
Walton-McKersie model, the more recent study suggests that
it is not sufficient to know that feedback was given; one
should also understand what the receiving party will decide to do about it- that is, those goals they will set
in response to the feedback. The premise that group be-

28 Op. cit., p. 761.
29 Teborg, J.R. and. Miller, H.E., Motivation, Behavior s And.
Performance, Journal of Applied Psychology,vol. 63,
1978, pp. 29-39.
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effectiveness is reasonable. The premise that imprecise
cues(offered as tactics in the attitudinal structuring
model) serve to bring about attitude change lacks operational validity based on materials researched. It is
clarity of enterprise mission and the relevance of that
mission to each operative in the collective bargaining
process that determine in part the consequence of behavior
patterns derived from negotiation. The effectiveness of
interactive feedback is inhibited when singularly directed
as in the Walton-McKersie model. It is more to the negotiator's advantage (and their respective organizations)
to bargain towards commonalities of purpose and to reduce
the influence of competitively oriented tactics that are
not saliently related to the enterprise mission.
As the thesis concept suggests, the value of the
Walton-McKersie model in an operational context is as an
,

aid to planning processes for the various operatives. By
characterizing, classifying, and compiling historical
behavioral profiles of their negotiating processes, a
number of benefits can be derived. First of all, it
results in the identification of trends or changes in the
same. It helps to identify sensitivities of respective
operatives, examine assumptions about one another, and
structure a program for constructive relations improvement.
What Walton and McKersie have provided to do all of this
is a framework. All the users have to do is customize it
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exploring the intrinsic processes and relationships peculiar to the institution of collective bargaining. The
model affords a means to detect opportunities for improvement and to mediate them as well.
All of the above declarations are derived from the
fact that the Walton-McKersie taxonomy indicates the
variables in the collective bargaining process that have
to be investigated for behavioral change analysis. Also,
the identification and classification of bargaining behaviors that Walton axis McKersie describe determines in
part the extent to which data can be generalized from
one bargaining situation to another.
By classifying (1) the behaviors that tend to be
present during bargaining "tasks" (2) the behaviors,
functions, or processes required for what is thought to be
successful bargaining performance (3) the perceptions
that operatives have of one another in the various relationship pattern categories and (4) the characteristics
of the various relationship patterns in terms of their
associated stimulus and response qualities, one can begin
to appreciate the analytical and informational value of
the Walton-McKersie model.

SECTION IV.
CONTEMPORARY CASE STUDY ILLUSTRATING THE
TENETS OF THE WALTON-McKERSIE MODEL

The discussion in this chapter is presented to illustrate and explore salient tenets of the Walton-McKersie
attitudinal structuring model. The 1 981 Professional Air
Traffic Controllers Organization(PATCO) strike provides
a contemporary case study that lends itself to the behavioral principles of the theory within a systems context,
which is the framework in which the thesis concept is
founded.
First, a recapitulation of the strike and PATCO
30Solidarity", The Nation, vol. 233, August 22, 1981,
p. 132.
31

Chaz, W.L. and others, "Air Strike Starts To Wear Down
All Sides", U.S. News & World ,Re ort, vol. 91,
August 17, 1981, pp. 2-23.

32 "Challenge To Government Tactics Used Against PATCO", U.S.
News & World Report, vol. 91, August 31, 1981
pp. 17-20,76.
33 Biller, M. and Lewis, D.L., "Should The U.S. Grant Amnesty
To Air Controllers?", U.S. News & World Report,
vol. 91, August 24, 1981, pp. 18-19.
34 Ott, J., "Plans Laid To Counteract Strike", Aviation Week,
vol. 114, June 8, 1981, pp. 65-66.
35 Kilpatrick, J.J., "They Struck A Blow For Tyranny",
National Review, vol. 33, October 2, 1981, pp. 1132+.
-.37-

-38-

bargaining history is in order. The references researched
were numerous and often redundant relating the information
regarding the strike. For brevity, and to eliminate redundant footnotes, all periodicals referenced are listed on
page 37.
The strike began on August 3, 1981. Within a month
or so media coverage had waned. It was perceived that the
managenment operative was victorious and that the labor
operative had suffered a tremendous loss. 36
The PATCO strike exacted national emotion on all
fronts and was truly a strike of national dimension that
had been looming for several years. When the strike began,
the Federal Aviation Administration(FAA) had 26,635 controllers. Approximately 4,600 were assigned to flight
service stations and another 4,600 were trainees, specialists, and supervisors. The population of controllers
figured to be directly involved in the strike consisted of
roughly 8,870 controllers assigned to the nation's airportterminal control towers and 7,632 controllers assigned to
en-route centers.
The system that was the strike target is structured
into five levels primarily based on air traffic volume,
and to a lesser degree, on the proximity of potentially
hazardous geographical obstacles such as mountains. The
0=========
36 Butler, L., "Reagan Botched The Strike", Newsweek, vol. 93
August 31, 1981, p. 9.
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The lowest level include such airports as Charlottesville,
Virginia and Joplin, Missouri. Level II includes 158
airports, among which are Omaha, Nebraska, and Huntington,
West Virginia. Level III has 108 airports which include
Long Beach, California and Erie, Pennsylvania. Thirtyeight airports are in Level IV. Phoenix, Kansas City, and
Baltimore are some examples. The highest level, Level V,
has sixteen airports which are the busiest ones such as
Chicago's 0' Hare International, Los Angeles International,
and Washington National.
The en-route centers are ten in number in the continental United States. Another five are : located in Hawaii,
Alaska, Puerto Rico, and Guam. As a whole the domestic
system handled about 14,000 scheduled flights that comprised
an average of 800,000 passengers every day. Daily traffic
volume included the freighters that fly ten thousand tons
of air cargo, mostly by night, and thousands of privately
owned planes classified as "general aviation". The scheduled commercial airlines employed well over 300,000 persons;
revenues were in the magnitude of $30 billion per year and
the industry approximated about 3% of the gross national
product. This was the system in which the confrontation
between operatives took place.
Since its inception in 1968, PATCO had a history of
job-actions and slowdowns. Within seven months of its
beginnings the Union staged a work rules slowdown. In
1969, 477 controllers staged a sickout. In the spring of
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1970, three thousand PATCO members went on strike. Then
again in 1976, a Union slowdown inhibited air traffic.
Between the years 1968 and 1981, various operatives
within the system showed numerous retaliatory actions
towards one another. In 1970, a strike, which was triggered by the FAA's transfer of several controllers against
their will, resulted in nearly one thousand air traffic
controllers being suspended and fifty-two of them fired.
The Air Transport Association won an out-of-court settlement of $50 million damage suit against the Union. The
Department of Labor rescinded PATCO's status as an accredited union. However, after PATCO agreed not to engage
in illegal job-actions, recognition was restored. In
addition, the federal courts directed that the Union be
put under a continuing no-strike injunction.
The position and activism of the Union was spurned by
charges that the air traffic control system was plagued by
inadequate equipment, understaffing, job-related stress,
and frequent computer breakdowns. In light of these
factors, PATCO leaders and general membership felt they
were justly entitled to greater compensation and retirement benefits than those provided other federal employees.
To appease these protests, the FAA attempted, and
was successful in acquiring funds to upgrade system equipment and controllers salaries. When the strike broke out,
salaries of air traffic controllers had improved to a
point where their average compensation was $33,000 per year.

-41The range of salaries were $15,193 for an entering trainee
at step 1 of the government grade 7 to a maximum of $49,229
at the top of grade 14.
Based on materials researched, the increased activism
of the Union is attributable to a change in the Union's
presidency. In 1980, John Leyden was ousted and was
replaced by Robert Poll. Poll was considered less of a
pacifist, and appealed to the Union's firebrands. Poll
was characterized as a man with a mission. Soon after
he came aboard, the Union began to build a strike fund
and Poll instituted a massive "awareness campaign". The
purpose of the campaign was to educate Union membership
on the impending strike.
The campaign was a hefty package of written material
sent to each union member. Included was a substantial
legal memorandum issued by the Union's executive vice
president, Robert E. Meyer, informing in no uncertain
terms that "it is illegal for the air traffic controllers
to strike." He warned of injunctions, and contempt pro-

ceedings if injunctions were disobeyed. He reminded the
union membership that federal law sanctions termination of
employment as government recourse to striking federal
employees. However, the focal point of the awareness
campaign was on preparation and rallying the troops for
the strike. The awareness campaign's success manifested
itself in the amazingly resolute solidarity of the Union
once the strike began.

-42Materials used in the Union's awareness campaign
fell into the hands of the FAA, whose response was reciprocal preparedness for the impending strike. In a
subsequent edition of the Federal Register, the FAA spelled
out a plan of action in the event of a PATCO strike.
In February, 1981 negotiations between PATCO and
the FAA began for a new contract. Several salient demands
among some ninety-six presented were (1) a $10,000 a year
across the board raise for each member of the PATCO bargaining unit (2) two annual cost of living increases at
one and a half times the rate of inflation (3) a four day,
thirty-two hour work week with a twenty percent night

shift differential (versus ten percent currently in effect)
and (4) a retirement package that would pay seventy-five

percent of a member's highest salary after twenty years
of service regardless of age. The 1978 contract provided
opportunity for controllers to retire at age fifty at
fifty percent of a certain average salary with at least
twenty years of service. It has been estimated that the
cost of these and various other demands would have been
in the magnitude of $1.1 billion in the first year alone.
The initial counter offer by the FAA was a $40 million
package that contained an across-the-board raise of $4,000
per year, a increase in the night differential, and compensation at time and a half for the last four hours of
a forty hour work week, among other things.
The collective bargaining process continued inter-
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mittently through spring and early summer, resulting in
a compromised Union position that modified estimated
first year costs of a new contract to the fifty million
dollar range. The FAA stood firm on their $40 million
offer, however the agency did agree to let PATCO allocate
the offer as it saw fit. On June 22, 1981, Poll and his
executive board accepted what was said to be the FAA's
final offer. Admittedly Poli said "I feel good about it."
Ten days later the Union's rank-in-file dismissed
the proposed agreement as an insult and voted it down
by a twenty-to-one margin. Poli, in a news conference
on July 31, 1981, informed the FAA that if the Union's
principal demands were not met, they would strike on
August 3, 1981. The FAA asked for an extension of the
Union's deadline. Poli refused. A few weak bargaining
sessions ensued with the FAA upgrading its offer to a
$50 million package with certain pre-conditions. The
Union operatives rejected those conditions and a strike
of some 13,000 controllers began.

A. A Discussion Of Model Thesis Tenets And Propositions
Evidenced In The PATCO Strike
In the systems context, the operatives in the air
traffic controllers situation were (1) the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which in this case served as
both employer and the agent of government that Dunlop
refers to (see Section III., page 16.), (2) the Profession-
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al Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) which
represented organized labor and (3) the Reagan Administration which represented government interest in the strike.
If one were to characterize the relationship that existed
between PATCO and the FAA since the inception of the Union
it would fall into the category of containment-aggression.
As noted in the historical profile of the relation, within
seven months after its inception PATCO members were involved

in a work rules slowdown. A sick-out was staged about a
year later. A strike of 3,000 members went into effect
in the spring of 1970. Again, in 1976 the Union staged
another slowdown, and 1981 another strike and the subsequent confrontation between operatives. PATCO's action

tendencies, aside from the strikes, reflect what the model
calls moderately competitive behaviors. There was evidence
of the Union trying to, and succeeding in extending its

scope of influence, and the FAA's retaliatory efforts to
contain the Union's scope of influence and action. Both
sides generally accepted and honored the limits of the
law, and negotiating tended to be confined to substantive
items such as pay, hours, and working conditions. As
Walton and McKersie suggested, in a containment-aggression
relationship pattern operatives will gladly weaken the
organization or the position of the other's officials,
as well as show interest in not only gaining the allegiance
of the workers but also detracting from the loyalty enjoyed

-45by the other. 37

On the part of PATCO, this was evidenced

by their attempt to scorn President Reagan's ultimatums
against a strike. On the part of the government (in this
case, employer as well) an awesome counter attack consisting of court orders, arrests, mass firings, and fines
illustrate the action tendencies 38 Walton and McKersie
describe for the conflict relationship pattern, which was
reverted to when no accord could be reached under the
containment-aggression pattern that existed prior to the
strike. An attempt to sway worker allegiance away from
PATCO by the government is evidenced by its offer to
accept those air traffic controllers back into the employ
of the FAA if they returned within the specified grace
period. This can also be construed as an individualistic
motivational orientation in that by offering and winning
over worker allegiance, the government (and FAA) gave
the impression of being accomodating, while also trying
to strengthen their image and functional position.
When no agreement could be reached, actions described
by Walton and McKersie in a conflict relationship pattern
appeared. They were on the Union's part (1) a denial
of the legitamacy of the government's ends and means by
reneging on an oath not to strike against their employer
(2) a refusal to bargain in good faith (3) inclinations
37 Walton and. McKersie, op. cit., p. 186.
38 Op. cit., U.S.
p. 17.

News & World Report, August 17, 1981,
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to discredit officials of the government with comments
such as, "Denying federal employees the right to strike
becomes a sort of refuge for government bureaucrats.
They can ignore problems for years and repress workers
who seek to, change bad conditions through collective
bargaining." 39 Emotionalism and animosity is exhibited
in an editiorial in The Nation that states "The effort
to destroy PATCO by means of mass firings is the most
serious union-busting attempt in any developed capitalist country in decades." 40
On the government's part, denial of the Union's
legitamacy was evidenced by its irreversible position
regarding the strike. Their refusal to bargain was
predicated on the fact that the strike was an illegal
act, which obviated their responsibility to bargain in
good faith. Animosity on the government's part manifested itself by their use of all resources (legal,
mind you!) to ultimately destroy PATCO by revoking its
license, by the use of court orders, by replacing controllers that struck with new hires, etc.
The key contexual factors contributing to the final
confrontation were (1) a change in the political and administrative philosophy of the FAA (2) a change in the
39 0p. cit., U.S. News & World Report, August 24, 1981,
p. 18.
40 Op. cit., The Nation, August 22, 1981, p. 132.

-.47Union's leadership (Poli versus Leyden) and (3) growing
public sentiment against strikes in general, and the
PATCO strike in particular. These are the antecedant
factors that characterize this particular circumstance.
As stated in the thesis table of assumptions, collective
bargaining takes place in varying political, economic,
and social climates and are affected by changes occurring
in these dimensions. Failure by PATCO to reckon with
the consequences of these contextual factors lead to
PATCO's demise.
Some of the structuring strategy/tactics and behavioral change attempts present in the PATCO situation
that Walton and McKersie allude to in their model are as
follows. First of all, they purport to present a systematic model of the negotiating process and then assert
the way people tend to behave. The model constraints
are: (1) it addresses only attitudes towards a person
or organization (2) the target of structuring activities
is the operative employed; not the employer (3) employer
attitudes are only of interest when they become instrumental in changing inter-organizational attitudes and
(4) the employer has certain explicit and implicit assumptions about its workforce's existing attitudes and
their structure, i.e., which attitudes are more controlling
of their behavior relevant to the employer. Also, which
of these are more readily accessible to influence. On
the basis of this information the operative (employer)

-48-

makes certain judgements about the particular attitudes
of the target operative which are promising areas for the
initiating operative's change efforts. In brief then the
initiating operative wants to modify the target operative's
attitude and behavior towards him, assumably in the
direction of friendliness, trust, respect, or legitimacy.
Threats and tangible sanctions are addressed as
tactics in the model. They are competitively motivated
and characteristic of the conflict relationship pattern.
As previously stated, the PATCO-FAA-GOVERNMENT relationship was one of containment-aggression. Aggravated by
insensitivities by the parties, this was heightened to
a relation of conflict. As Walton and McKersie point
out, a deviation from an established relationship pattern
in a negative direction usually results from an involved
operative's violation of some rule governing the relation.
The violation of a rule in the PATCO case was the strike
in the eyes of the FAA and government. From the Union's
standpoint lack of good faith bargaining was the rule
violated. The work slowdowns, sick-outs, and strikes
prior to 1981 had different contextual components (mentioned above) that were able to avert showdowns like the
one in 1981. However, in all cases the object was to
enhance bargaining posture and to perhaps modify behavior.
As evidenced by some air traffic controllers who returned
to work before the Presidential grace period ended, behavior modification was successful. This was achieved by
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the FAA/government stance which in of itself was a form
of cognitive instability Walton and McKersie speak of.
Just as the Union's stance (with so much to lose after
the ultimatums were issued) was a form of cognitive instability to the FAA and government.
Now the principal propositions exerted by Walton
and McKersie in their theory will be discussed. They
exerted that a link exists between bargaining goals and
behavior; and that those behaviors serve as indices for
inferring goal conflict or perceived goal conflict.
Conversely, they feel the knowledge that goal structures
are in conflict becomes the basis for predicting those
class of behaviors identified in their taxonomy. First,
implicit in the idea that a link exists between goals
and behavior is that people will be motivated, to do
things to achieve some goal to the extent that they
expect that certain actions on their part will help them
achieve the goal. A theory in support of this concept
is Victor H. Vroom's valence-expectancy theory. He
purported that a person's proclivity toward an action
would be determined by his or her anticipated values of
all outcomes(both positive and negative) of the action,
multiplied by the strength of that person's expectancy,
that the outcome would yield the desired goal. In other
words, he argued that motivation was a product of the
anticipated worth to a person of an action and the perceived probability that that person's goals would be
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attained, Using his own terms, Vroom's theory may therefore be atated as follows:

FORCE = VALENCE X EXPECTANCY

Here, force is the relative desire or other intrinsic
pressures of the person to strive, valence is the person's
inclination towards a particular outcome, and expectancy
is the person's belief that a given action will probably
lead to a desired outcome. Although these principles deal
with the motivation of individuals, they can be extended
to represent the same forces that motivate operatives in
the collective bargaining process. In PATCO's case,
"Force" in the equation was typified by the Union's
solidarity and its unrelenting drive and preparation for
a strike. Although the outcome was a gross miscalculation
on the Union's part, "Valence", as expressed in the
formula was typified by the Union's persistent reliance
on past bargaining strategies and tactics to guide their
current actions (i.e., slowdowns, sick-outs, strikes,
etc.). "Expectancy" was the Union's apperception that
political, economic, and societal forces were the same
as in past bargaining histories and relations. It was
past tactical successes that lead PATCO to believe that
their current actions would lead to the desired outcome
of a settlement.
What Vroom's theory illustrates relative to the link
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between goals and behavior, and what the empirical study
by Jackson and Zedeck indicates, is that goals and behavior are the cognitive mediators for change. The
goals that served as cognitive mediators for PATCO were
improved compensation, improved work conditions, and
improved hours over existing levels of the same. These
same goals in turn mediated a change in behavior that is
descriptive under the containment-aggression relationship
pattern to behaviors characteristic of a conflict relationship pattern. An example of this illustrated by the
case study facts is how the aforementioned goals, and
the expectancy that they could be attained through jobactions and strikes, motivated the Union's membership.
Under the leadership of John Leyden, the motivational
orientation was towards what Walton and McKersie classify
as a containment-aggression relationship pattern. However,
under the leadership of Robert Poli, the Union's increas-

ing militancy was characteristic of the relationship
pattern Walton and McKersie designate as conflict.
The PATCO case study therefore supports the WaltonMcKersie proposition that bargaining goals and behaviors
are linked.
The question of whether or not the behaviors exhibited by respective operatives in the PATCO strike
served as indices for behavioral prognostication will now
be addressed. Behavioral inference in the PATCO case was
amiss because operatives underestimated the effect changes
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in political, economic, and social climates had on their
relationship. Under the leadership of Robert Poli, the
Union assumed a more assertive position and solidarity
had been well nurtured in preparation for a strike.
The FAA and government failed to heed this change in
"valence" on the Union's part. The Union misconstrued
the "new policies" of the Reagan Administration as rhetoric, and felt that the bargaining process would be
business as usual, with an impending strike that was
perceived by Poli and the Union membership to be crippling
leverage in the relationship. These miscalculations
proved costly for all involved. This suggests the importance of systems considerations in effectively assessing one's bargaining posture. It also supports the thesis
statement that the predictive utility of the WaltonMcKersie model, as it stands, requires enhancement for
use as a prognostic tool. As the PATCO case illustrates,
a limiting factor in the model is the disregard for
overall contextual (or systems) factors as they relate
to behavioral change activities. To increase its-predictive power and reliability in reducing the indeterminacy factors in labor negotiations, the model should
be less singularly directed, and include contingency
premises. This would give users of the model flexibility
and better represent the dynamic factors that are peculiar
to collective bargaining. The affectivities of contextual

-53-

factors not only underscore the systems aspects of collective bargaining but also emphasizes how emergent bargaining relationship patterns depend on and influence operative
interaction in the process.
In summary then, bargaining models must be based on
contingencies to be effective for operational application.
How well a model of a system represents variables and
interactions of the real world is the true measure of its
applicability.

SECTION V.
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR BEHAVIORAL THEORY IN
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

The following synopsis of research findings relevant to the thesis concept and to the Walton-McKersie
model are offered to guide further research in the area.
Most of the behavioral research material reviewed directs
its attention primarily towards individual motivation
and behavior and the effects thereof. Relatively little
experimentation or study was found that related to interactive group motivation/behavior and the change thereof.
This is where the thesis concept sticks its neck out
by extending individual behavioral findings to the systems
concept of collective bargaining. The things they address
suggest relevance to the tenets and propositions of the
Walton-McKersie model.
The key thing that past and future behavioral studies
related to relationship and goal modification can do is
to help to understand how to motivate bargaining agreements that are coterminously oriented to goals and objectives of the respective operatives.
The experimental finding of Susan E. Jackson and
Sheldon Zedeck reported in the December 1982 issue of the
Journal of Applied Psychology(op. cit.), was that specific,
difficult goals lead to better performance than less
specific, easy type goals. The analysis focused on the
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relative contributions to performance of situational
factors. These are equivalent to what the
Walton-Mckersie model designate as antecedent or determinant
conditions or the environmental climate in which operatives interact. Second, the experiment examined how the
nature of a task affected performance. In collective
bargaining the tasks are cognitive in nature, which is
an aspect addressed in the Jackson-Zedeck analysis.
Third, the effect goals, and their adjustment, have on
performance is examined. Finally, the effect circumstantial factors have on performance is explored.
Jackson and Zedeck assert that the impact of situational factors in which given behaviors occur are
often not considered in research related to goal-setting,
although there have been indications that behavioral
performance can reliably be altered by these factors.
The results from the Jackson-Zedeck analysis are
as follows:
-Performance was significantly higher among subjects
who were given specific goals in both the easy and
difficult design setting as compared to subjects
given a general do-your-best or no goal condition.
-Performance in the difficult/goal condition was
significantly higher than performance in the no
goal and do-your-best conditions; however, performance in the difficult/goal condition was not
significantly different from performance in the
easy/goal condition.
-For the manual task, performance in the difficult/
goal condition was significantly higher than performance in the no goal condition.
-In both the manual and cognitive tasks, the sit-
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uational setting affected performance.
-In the compliance condition, performance was
lowest, rather than high as one might be lead to
believe.
-Self-set personal goals were more prevalent in
the manual task under the compliance condition,
with only marginal differences noted for the cognitive task.
-The impact of goal setting on low task variety
assignments versus high variety assignments is
nominally the same.
The research implications for the above findings as
they apply to the Walton-McKersie model of attitudinal
structuring are (1) Are goals, moreso than attitudes, of
organizations easier to mediate in collective bargaining
interactions? (2) Can paradigms and experiments be designed that elicit the behavioral characteristics associated with collective bargaining processes so that
theory propositions might be tested and validated? (3)
Can correlates be developed to test how well results from
behavioral studies can be "cross-fertilized" and generalized from one given area of sty to another.
For reference and guidance as to the methodology
used in such study, details of the Jackson-Zedeck study
are included in Appendix C.

SECTION VI.
APPRAISAL CRITERIA AND MODEL
ASSESSMENT
In assessing the operational utility of a given
model the following criteria are often.
1. The degree to which the behavioral framework
of the model encompassed conceptually and realistically
the true architecture of labor negotiations.
2. The degree to which ambiguity exists in model
descriptors. Also, is the model readily adaptable for
simulation techniques and measurements?
3. The degree to which propositions offered embellish existing knowledge and interpretative treatments
of labor negotiations.
4. The degree of internal consistency in the model.
5. The degree to which model logic (rules) adequately link the theoretical concepts of the model to stated
principles.
6. The degree to which the model affords its theoretically derived predictions to be empirically or
otherwise tested.
The model neither accepts or rejects the institutionalized practice of labor negotiations. What it is
is an intellectual model of an ideal of the cognitive
and behavioral aspects of the process. To support the
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propositions and properties of the model, theory, logic,
and empirical data from various fields related to behavioral science was used. The model's validity is experential
in nature, relying on the American experience of collective
bargaining to prove out its heuristic propositions and
operational utility. In this sense then, the attitudinal
structuring model is a blueprint for what can be, not
of what is. Conceptually it explores and stimulates
such questions as:
-What is the nature of the relationship that is
desired to be changed?
-What are the reasons for initiating such a change?
-How will the roles of respective operatives involved
in the change be perceived by those affected?
-Is there a way to assess and/or evaluate the bargaining session against specified objectives?
In any given bargaining circumstance, the interrelation of the answers to these questions can be formulated into a planning model of an overall change program
as they are all interdependent with one another. They
are also the basis for further research in the area of
behavioral science as it relates to relationship and
goal modification in collective bargaining. For example,
there is a clear opportunity for researching the correlates
between the nature of a given relationship pattern with
the reasons for wanting to initiate a change, and so on.
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Answers to questions such as these will help operatives
initiating change support the philosophy of what they are
doing, and the more successful they are at developing
deliberate and consistent bargaining strategies, the
more all involved in the process will see that an overall strategy exists.
It is recognized that little change in the "bargaining" status quo has come about over the years. The
implications deduced from the model's propositions are
that it is desirable and beneficial to all to strive for
coherent bargaining objectives. The model provides
theory, logic, and the taxonomy for compiling empirical
data regarding bargaining performance. The thesis proposition is that through its analytical and informational
qualities, the use of the model has utility for enhancing
enthusiasm for change and participation in it, rather
than resistance to change. Conceptually, the theory
of attitudinal structuring is analogous to the team
building concept in Management By Objectives(MBO).41
Like team-building, the Walton-McKersie attitudinal
structuring model is intended to be a facilitative and
tactical approach to labor negotiations. By refocusing
modification efforts from attitudes to goals as the
thesis proposition suggests, the model can serve to make
41 Lasagna, J.B., "Make Your MBO Pragmatic", Harvard
Business Review, vol. 49, no. 6, NovemberDecember, 1971, pp. 65-69.
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labor negotiations more effective in reaching constructive
labor agreements as well as achieve commonality of purpose amongst operatives. The heritage of collective
bargaining in America has been one where operatives in
the process show highly individualistic and competitive
behaviors with each contending with the other for greater
power, prestige, recognition, and organizational autonomy.
As such, unity of purpose has fell by the wayside, and

the effectiveness of labor negotiations and emergent
relationship patterns have suffered. That is not to say
that elimination of disagreements should be a goal,
although consensual resolve should be. To paraphrase
the words of Douglas McGregor 42 in summarizing where
the conceptual loci of relationship modification should
be in labor negotiations- it is only when operatives in

the collective bargaining process have a clear realization that commitment to overall objectives(system),
and their collaboration in initiating constructive and
productive collective agreements toward that end, that
a meaningful change will come about in their relationship. Conceptually the tenets discussed here are representative of true behavioral forces at play in labor

42 McGregor, D., The Human Side of Enterprise., New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960, pp. 227-243.
McGregor, D., The Professional Manager, New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967, pp. 106-111, 160-182.
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negotiations. The propositions offered are consistent
with exhibited labor, management, and government goals
and objectives attendant in the negotiating process.
From a more pragmatic perspective, the model's
architecture focuses only on one operative's association
with and/or action towards some outcome or event and how
another operative views that association or action and
how they might go about changing the first's cognitions
about it. A more realistic architecture for the model
would have to include reciprocal perceptions and actions,
and the responses thereof for all operatives in the

negotiating process.
The strength of the Walton-McKersie attitudinal
structuring model is its classification scheme and summary of sub-processes present in labor negotiations.
The design of their model is presented clearly with all
limitations, assumptions, and propositions identified
so as to minimize any misunderstanding of their intent.
The major weakness and ambiguity in the model is in
the discussion of techniques for executing structuring

strategy, and tactics for the same. The theoretical
framework discusses ways to alter normative behavior
but is (1) too prescriptive because operatives perceive
and assess normative behavior in different ways (2)
too presumptuous because operatives and their constituents are much more susceptible to normative influence
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within their respective organizations rather than from
an outside source(PATCO's denial of recognition of Presidential ultimatums in favor of union solidarity) and
(3) too preemptive in that the model analyzes and relies
on research and theory for rational behavior to support
its position, whereas it is a departure from "institutionalized rationality" that they are trying to impart.
In addition, the model does not account for the system
factors in the macro-context of collective bargaining
that surely must be addressed and considered for a successful operational model. Sawyer and Guetzow 43 suggest
that any social-psychological analysis (which is what
negotiations are in the attitudinal structuring model
theory) includes not only the process of bargaining
itself, but also (1) goals, motivating operatives to
interact, (2) consequences for each, all accruing within
and influenced by (3) pre-conditions of bargaining heritage and norms between and within the organizations
of respective operatives and (4) contextual pre-conditions,
which the thesis refers to as the systems context of
collective bargaining and requisite hierarchy of subordination.
Materials researched 44 had both qualitative and
43 Sawyer, J. and Guetzow, H., "Bargaining and Negotiation
In International Relations", in Kelman, H.C. (ed.),
International Behavior and Social Psychological
Anal sis, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965,
P.
44 Stephenson and Brotherton. OD. cit.. chanters 9 and 10.
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quantitative simulations of bargaining type processes
which indicate that the Walton-McKersie model could be
adapted to quantitative techniques of mathematical modeling for enhanced measurability of bargaining performance.
It is a decision making type model which lends itself
to probability theory, gaming theory, and risk analysis.
Jackson and Zedeck 45 used multivariate analysis of
variances and two-tailed "t" tests to analyze data derived from a questionnaire in their experiment of what
contributions goal setting, task characteristics, and
contextual factors have on human performance behavior.
A multiple regression model was used by Stahl and
Harrell 46 to analyze subjects' affinity for achievement,
autonomy, and affiliation. The implications of the
Stahl-Harrell exercise for the Walton-McKersie model is
that with techniques and methodology such as theirs,
behavioral affinities classified in the attitudinal
structuring model can possibly be "measured" in a similar
manner.
Most of the model's propositions are needed statements of self-evident truths. What Walton and McKersie
45 Op. cit.
46 Stahl, M.J. and Harrell, A.M., "Evaluation and Validation Of A Behavioral Decision Theory Measurement
Approach To Achievement, Power, and Affiliation",
Journal of Applied Psychology, vol. 67, December,
1982, pp. 744-751.
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have accomplished is a summarization of the self-evident
truths characteristic of labor negotiations, and integrated
them with current behavioral theory knowledge. In that
sense, knowledge in the field has been embellished.
The only salient instance noted where principles
within the model contradicted one another is the statement
that the model assumes that operatives wish to modify
attitudes in the direction of more trust, friendliness,
and cooperation, or at least maintain the existing level
of the same in their current relationship. The thesis
position argues that the systems of rewards and punishments
and the concept of balance theory offered by Walton and
McKersie to motivate behavioral change militates against
cooperative relationships and is conceptually inconsistent.
The rules or logic of the model stress identification
and manipulation of operatives' attitudes and behaviors
to serve the objective of only one of the operatives
involved in negotiations. The propositions generated
are consistent with, except as noted, and supportive of
the model's theoretical construct (see page 13 for statement of theory propositions).
Finally, as mentioned before, the experential nature
of the model itself is amenable to empirical and mathematical testing and measurement. This allows opportunities
for research of the model and its application in the field,
and also in the study of labor negotiations. The more
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congruence and compatibility found to exist between the
two, the more validity and acceptance the model will have,

SECTION VII.
SUMMARY OF THESIS STATEMENT AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Observations
Behavior modification and other relationship structuring activities should not be viewed as a natural byproduct of labor negotiations. These activities do not
just happen as a matter of course and cannot be left to
chance. To the contrary, they must be deliberate and
well thought out, with recognition of potential consequence
whether it be good or bad. The development of awareness
of behavioral structuring activities in labor negotiations
must be a carefully guided process, in which all parties
involved understand their role, and the role of one
another, as well as the goals of one another.
Moreover, opportunity awareness for behavior and

goal adjustment in labor negotiations can no longer go
unheeded. Negotiators must be primed for more than simply
"bartering" traditional substantive items, although
this aspect of negotiations will continue to be a focal
point. However, collective bargaining agreements can
be enhanced by operatives continually evaluating outcomes of the process as well as the process of collective
bargaining itself. Walton and McKersie provide a taxonomy and set of criteria which is the foundation for
development of such evaluative processes.
As the thesis statement suggests, as well as supported
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by Drucker47, attitudinal structuring as presented in
the model cannot succeed and will not succeed to alter
traits of personality or attitude. Attempts to remake
someone's personality or attitude posture frequently
fail because those traits are cognitive rigidities developed from individual experience over long periods
of time. However, relationship structuring activities
do have utility in modifying operative goals in such a
way so as to get them to behave coterminously relative
to enterprise goals.
Acceptance of the Walton-McKersie concepts will
flourish only if users believe in it enough to try it.
Its utility is somewhat analogous to management training,
organizational development, etc., where although costs
and benefits are not easily measured, users assume that
a net gain towards enterprise goals will be attained
through its application. If operatives and their agents
in the negotiating process begin to coach, guide, and
assist others in their respective organizations about
this untapped opportunity for change, awareness of its
concept and dedication and development towards it use
will flourish. Just like any other management function,
labor negotiations and its sub-processes must involve
analyzation, planning, and re-appraisal if its utility
47 Drucker, P.P., Management: Tasks, Responsibilities,
Practices., New York: Harper & Row, 1974.

is to be enhanced.
As previously stated, collective bargaining in the
systems context is a legislated abstract devised so that
the enterprise components of our national system of
commerce can self-regulate their attendant labor-management

relations. On a smaller scale within the context of
labor negotiations itself, the concepts presented in the
Walton-McKersie attitudinal structuring model serve as
the mechanism for operatives to self-regulate and/or

develop their interactive relations. Implicit in the
term "self-regulate" is the reality that although the
means and opportunities may exist for change, operatives
must choose to change if enhancement of their relation
is to occur. By making all parties aware of commonalities
of purpose and bargaining consequences, hopefully the
right choices will be made.
Through reiterative evaluations, relationship strengths
and weaknesses can be identified. Through an enhanced
Walton-McKersie model, patrons of collective bargaining
can begin to see where and why failures to their interactive processes exist, pinpoint needs, and learn about
various ways by which to improve those interactive processes.
The following is a distillation of ideas from materials researched that seem to be the preconditions
necessary in a bargaining circumstance for successful
structuring and modification activity:

-69-

- CLEARLY DEFINED AND CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD RESPONSIBILITIES
- COMMENSURATE LATITUDE IN ONE'S ASSIGNMENT TO
ALLOW CONTINGENCY ACTION GIVEN UNFORSEEN CIRSTANCES
- CONSTRUCTIVE FEEDBACK OF INFORMATION BY WHICH
PERFORMANCE CAN BE MEASURED
- FOCUS ON CHANGES TO WORK AND/OR GOALS RATHER
THAN PERSONALITY OR ATTITUDES
In the same light, the following behavioral tenets
must be recognized and accepted to effectively plan,
design, and execute goal adjustment strategy in the
bargaining process. First, accepting the thesis proposition of requisite subordination, operatives adjust
goals only to the extent that they exercise increasingly
refined control over their thought processes, actions,
and behavior, bringing them coterminously in line with
enterprise and system goals. This in a sense refutes
the Walton-McKersie proposition that discrepant cognitions
motivate attitudinal change. As one knows from his or her
own work experiences, one frequently has beliefs and
attitudes that are inconsistent with behavior(you may
not like or agree with your boss, however, more times
than not you do compromise your beliefs, and conform to
hierarchial opinion and act accordingly). Second, goal
modification is not a process of intrinsic behavioral
change, but one of extrinsic behavioral change. Extrinsic
behavioral change is more accessible and more easily
acculturated than intrinsic behavioral change. This

behavioral axiom supports the thesis proposition that
goals should be the focal point of modification in
collective bargaining rather than attitudes. Third,
as the recent work by Jackson and Zedeck suggests

°
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in designing and planning implementation of goal modification in collective bargaining one must remember
the importance of goal setting. People tend to either
change according to the particular demands of their circumstance and in accord to their potential, or they do
not change at all. The study findings suggest that in
a work environment lacking goal setting in its organization, performance will be less than optimal at any

given time; but the more pervasive goal setting is, the
more likely effort will approach optimal performance.
The implication for negotiating is collective agreements
that include productivity clauses, as well as profit

sharing or a combination thereof. Last, and this can
not be emphasized enough, the most important ingredient
of successful bargaining of coterminous operative goals
is the sincere interest and commitment by each toward

purposive change. Models such as the one presented by
Walton and McKersie is only a tool operatives can use to
examine and understand their interactive relation. By
no means is it purported to be a panacea, shortcut,
48 0
j
Op. cit., pp. 759-768.

or prodigious method for the development of frictionless
relationships in collective bargaining, as one can attest
no such model exists.
The research and development of behavioral theory
in labor negotiations and the concept of relationship
patterns is of import because operative relations is a
guiding link between successive bargaining sessions.
The nurturing of positive relations can only contribute
to the long term success of America's systems of service
and manufacture. As evidenced by the Japanese, enterprise goal awareness by employees, coupled with the four
(4) preconditions previously stated for successful structuring and modification activity, yields a significant
competitive edge.
Operatives of collective bargaining must keep abreast of major changes in the systems context of collective bargaining and appraise the effect of those changes
as it relates to the negotiating process and the anticipated outcomes thereof. In a like manner, bargaining
objectives must be adaptive to those changes.
The more significant changes in America's systems
of service and manufacture which are saliently impacting
the traditionality of collective bargaining focus and
consequent outcomes are:
1. Technological changes, which frequently require
changes in strategies, structures, and management styles.
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These can impact job security, training, internal organization, job design, productivity requirements, yield
requirements, quality requirements, etc., all of which

can be negotiable items between labor and management
operatives in a given enterprise environment. In terms
of collective agreements, technological changes force a
strain towards agreements that are tied into not only

quantitative output, but also qualitative output; profit
sharing versus piecework incentives; less rigid work
rules regarding job assignments across functional areas;
concession bargaining, etc.
2. Organization (unionizing) activities by managerial
and public employees. As the scope of influence of
unionism broadens, the more important the concept of

commonality of purpose. The human resource is a key
element in America's systems of service and manufacture.
As negotiating balance of power shifts to any one side
unchecked, bargaining outcomes can be catastrophic.
3.

International markets and availability of re-

sources. As markets expand overseas, so does investment
and dependency on foreign resources. Jobs, technology,
capital, human capital are all subject to transfer.
Distinctions must be made between domestic free enterprise
and international competition. The implication for

collective bargaining agreements is increased productivity.
Operatives of collective bargaining must never forget
that the driving force of the enterprise is efficient
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performance and profit. Productivity bargaining, and
the goals thereof, must be understood to minimize transfer of the resources mentioned above.

B. Considerations To Ensure Effective Goal And Relation
Modification Efforts In Collective Bargaining
From a management perspective, any type of purposive
change within an organization must be deliberate and
defensible. To implement a structuring or change model
such as the one Walton and McKersie set forth, preplanning is of concern to make sure the climate and
timing for change is ripe. This would involve, at various
levels between and with respective operative organizations,
discussing, setting, and communicating to a greater extent
coterminous goals as they relate to enterprise goals.
Establishing and adopting applicable strategies for
bargaining that will enhance the concept of peaceful
industrial coexistence amongst operatives. Devising
means to measure bargaining performance against criteria
that is consistent with the aforementioned themes, and
assurance from respective operative managements that
principals will have the resources to achieve these
objectives. All this adds up to recognizing that purposive goal adjustment and/or relationship change will
not occur through collective bargaining unless commitment
by all involved is attained.
As R.M. Beese so aptly put it:
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- Change is more acceptable when it does not
threaten security than when it does.
- Change is more acceptable when it is understood
than when it is not.
- Change is more acceptable when those affected
have helped to create it than when it has been
externally imposed.
- Change is more acceptable when it results from
an application of previously established impersonal principles than it is when it is dictated by personal order.
- Change is more acceptable if it has been planned
than when it is not planned.
- Change is more acceptable to those who share in
the benefits of change than to those who do not.
- Change is more acceptable if the organization
has been trained to accept change.
All of the above axioms 49
are necessary considerations
that must be addressed when implementing a change model
such as the Walton-McKersie bargaining model. They all
emphasize the importance of awareness and acceptance of
change as a way of life for continued enterprise well
being. Yet since people are resistant to change to some
degree, it is the challenge to operative management to
restructure and build their respective organizations
adaptable to change.
In utilizing collective bargaining as a mechanism
for goal modification and relationship improvement the
following principles are offered: (1) In the bargaining
49 Beese, R.M., "Company Planning Must Be Planned", Dun's
Review and Modern Industry, vol. 74, no. 4, April,
1957, pp. 62-63.
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process operatives must not lose sight of enterprise
objectives, and in pursuing a collective bargaining
agreement facilitation of those objectives has primacy
and benefit for all. (2) Bargaining performance must
begin to be measured by the amount it contributes to
enterprise objectives offset by the costs and other
unsought outcomes resulting from the process. Measurement should be conducted by all operatives so they can
better assess their respective posture in the systems
context of their interaction. (3) The primacy of their
interaction must be realized by each operative. It is
the collective agreement that precedes and binds the
execution of the policies it contains. The more operatives understand and agree to utilize rationally those
policies, the more coordinated and rewarding will be their
relationship. Finally, (4) in a period of technological,
political, and worldwide change, the more flexibility
that can be built into collective agreements, the more
operatives will be able to minimize potential losses
incurred during stalemates. As mentioned in (2), the
cost of the flexibility should be weighed by each operative to assess advantages and disadvantages.

C. Concluding Comments
From this study and analysis it is concluded that
the theory of attitudinal structuring, and behavioral
findings in support of its propositions, can be drawn
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together to form a body of pertinent knowledge for use
as an operational approach and working model for behavior modification and goal adjuctment efforts in
collective bargaining. This is an eclectic approach to
enhancing the Walton-McKersie model. It brings together
findings and recommendations from various areas of behavioral experimentation that will help to increase one's
understanding of the model's applicability in real-life
situations. The eclectic type of an approach has the
dual advantages of 1) organizing knowledge and experiences
relative to collective bargaining in such a way that
research questions are aroused and 2) providing "crossfertilization" of knowledge between fields which helps
move towards an operational model that better typifies
the multiplicity of behavioral factors inherent in labor
negotiations. However, the thesis concept of integrated
analysis of the Walton-McKersie model and the accompanying application to the PATCO strike can only be considered as having tentative value. The reasons for this are
as follows. First, most of the behavioral research
reviewed was directed at the individual rather than
hierarchial organizations comprised of individuals. As
such, questions and findings resulting from such research
may or may not have applicability to a systems type
model such as the one reviewed. Second, the behavioral
materials researched helped to explain the "how" and
"why" of certain attitudes and perceptions in collective
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bargaining situations, however, the ways in which
those attitudes and perceptions can be translated
into successful and productive bargaining agreements
is much less clear. Third, the thesis analysis of
bargaining interaction is crude in the sense that
constraints and premises inherent to it result in
inconclusive information that requires much more rigorous empirical and quantitative research to verify
the utility of the Walton-McKersie for actual application in collective bargaining.

D. Developmental
As a result of this research, a number of conclusions upon which further research may be directed,
as well as cautions about the use of existing collective
bargaining models, are outlined. They are as follows:
a) The Walton-McKersie model may be enhanced as
an operational model by future behavioral
resacht xminespcfatgories
cognitive tasks associated with the negotiating process.
b) Research that explores the relationships between the goals and charters of private and
public business concerns and the priorities
of national commerce will give additional insights to the thesis concept of "requisite
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hierarchy of subordination". This breaks
down into, first, what systems of service and
manufacture(public vs. private, auto industry
vs. airline industry, etc.) are more likely to
be subject to third party (government and/or
its agents) intervention when good faith bargaining ceases in a given circumstance? In
researching this question, the system of service or manufacture and its characteristics
should be the independent variables and the
dependent variable(measurement) is the perceived and/or actual effect conflict can have
on composite systems of commerce (intra-state,
inter-state, or national). Second, the effect
that national commerce priorities have on respective labor and management goals and functioning needs to be researched. In researching
this relation, the integral system of commerce
and its characteristics(industry, sector, etc.)
becomes the independent variables while the
labor and management bargaining performance
(e.g., quick settlement, prolonged strike,
etc.) becomes the dependent(measurement) variable.
c) Acknowledging that individual behavioral considerations exist in organizational settings
and that they may effect organizational goals,
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is the effect significant? As referenced in
the body of the thesis, there is a school of
thought that purports individual behavioral
effects may be, and often are minimal in the
systems context.
d) To what degree do data, conclusions, and principles derived from behavioral studies of the
individual and the group apply to the same in
formal organizational settings and system type
models of collective bargaining? Are the
principles transferrable between the "systems"
context and the "individual" context or vice
versa? If not, what are the reasons?
e) How can behavioral research results relevant
to the Walton-McKersie model be translated
into sound bargaining guidelines for behavior
modification and goal adjustment?
Since the primary goal of the thesis is to assist
in the development of an operational Walton-McKersie
model, answers to the above research questions will
enhance the model's utility in actual practice.

APPENDIX A.
IDENTIFICATION GUIDELINE FOR CHANGE

In light of the previous discussion, the following
guideline is presented to assist in the design of a
program to identify when relationship or goal modification is needed.
A modification need is described as existing any
time a relationship or goal condition differs from a
desired relationship or goal condition amongst operatives.
A thorough and accurate assessment of modification
needs must precede change attempts so that the initiating
operative can best decide on an approach for the desired
change. One approach entails the following major steps.
Step one should involve examination of relevant interactive factors external to the target operative's domain.
These include the dominant characteristics of past bargaining performance, as well as the salient values,
practices, and heritage that have been exhibited and
propogated by the target operative. In other words,
this step is a review of the antecedent and/or determinant forces Walton and McKersie speak of (see Figure
2.). This step entails a review and assessment of the
target operative's acculturated posture. This refers
to those attitudinal and goal orientations which have
been learned, shared within the organization, transmitted between organizational boundaries by members to in-80-
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crease scope of influence. The kinds of information
gained from the above will be: (1) an assessment of the
target population's strength, solidarity, support by
public sentiment, etc. (2) identification of norms within the target operative's population; how receptive
constituents will be to change; whether or not openness
and cooperation is valued more than hostility and adversarial relations. (3) an estimation of how all of the
above are either consistent or inconsistent with the
initiating operative's objective(s)(a form of measurement). (4) an indication of whether or not the majority in the target operative's population is comfortable
and/or satisfied with the organization's leadership.
Indications on this surely lets the initiating operative
know whether or not the climate is ripe for modification
attempts. (5) an indication to the initiating operative
of how to meld countervailing forces in a compromising
way to serve their objectives.
Step two involves an assessment of operatives'
principals(negotiators, NLRB, mediators, etc.) to labor
negotiations. Do they require additional training and
skills to execute modification attempts in the bargaining
process? As alluded to by George R. Terry 50 managing
of this type may require a greater degree of psychology,
50

Terry, G.R., Principles of Management, Homewood, In.:
Richard D. Irwin, 1977, p. 9.

conceptual knowledge, and skill than bargainers are
traditionally equipped with.
Once the first two steps are accomplished, step
three should focus on weighing, developing, and communicating the target of modification in the bargaining
session. This would be the decided upon plan for implementation.

APPENDIX B.
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FINDINGS:
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE SURVEY OF
WORKERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD PRODUCTIVITY
- Workers In The U.S. Have, Generally Speaking, Positive
Outlooks About Contributing To Enterprise Objectives.
- Key Incentives For Good. Performance Were Identified As
Monetary And Personal Recognition.
- Management Abilities And. Attitudes Are Just As Important
And Critical To Improved Performance & Productivity As
Are Workers' Attitudes And Abilities.
- Workers Find Coterminous Effort And Decision Making
Conceptually Attractive.
- Workers In The U.S. Are Optimistic About Future
Enterprise Development And Growth.

RESPONDENTS FELT THAT DILIGENCE MADE:

WHO WORKERS FEEL WOULD BENEFIT MOST/LEAST FROM PRODUCTIVITY
AND PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT IN U.S. ENTERPRISES.

APPENDIX C.
DETAILS OF THE JACKSON-ZEDECK STUDY

The subjects in the experiment were two hundred
and sixty-three students who worked on two tasks(manual
and cognitive). For each subject, quantity of performance
was assessed for a cognitive and manual task. The experimental factors were: (1) type of goal(no goal, doyour-best, easy, and difficult) (2) evaluative context
(control, peer evaluation, and compliance) (3) task
variety(low, high) and (4) order of task completion
(cognitive task first, or manual task first). Subjects'
satisfaction with their performance and their reactions
to the tasks were assessed in a questionnaire completed
at the end of the experiment.
Most subjects participated in this experiment in
groups of three, some subjects in groups of two, and
a few worked alone. Tests of the impact of group size
showed no significant effect. All subjects in the peer
evaluation condition participated in groups of three.
Within each session, all subjects worked under the same
experimental condition, which was randomly assigned.
Each subject worked at a table which faced away
from the other subjects in the room. Upon arrival to
the experiment, subjects were told they would be working on several tasks similar to the kinds of tasks people
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work on in various jobs. The subjects first task was
explained to them and they were given ten minutes to
practice the task. After the practice session, subjects
were told they would be working on the task for twentyfive minutes and that they would then stop and begin a
new task. Subjects who were given goals were told their
goals at this point. After working on the first task
for twenty-five minutes, subjects were stopped and the
second task was explained. As for the first task, subjects were given ten minutes to practice the second task.
Goals were then assigned, when applicable, and a twentyfive minute work session followed. Upon completion of
the second task, subjects were given post test questionnaires to complete.
The manual task involved an assembly assignment
of a three dimensional model(e.g. toy jeep, tractor,
etc.). The pieces required to build one model were
enclosed in a envelope with an instruction sheet. The
instructions consisted of two pictures, one picture
showing the model half built and one showing the model
completely built. By comparing the model they were
building with the pictures, subjects were exposed to a
means of feedback about the quality of their performance.
Completed models remained on their tables until the end
of the twenty-five minute testing session, thereby pro-
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viding performance feedback to the subjects about quantity
of models they had completed.
The cognitive task used in the experiment involved
subjects reviewing a floor plan of a one story, three
room building. All rooms were four-sided. Although
the dimensions of each were not indicated on the floor
plan, sufficient information was provided to enable the
subjects to determine the dimension of each room. The
task was to evaluate the number of units of carpeting
to purchase (a) for each room, assuming a different color
would be used in each room and (b) for the entire building, assuming the same color would be used in all rooms.
To provide feedback to subjects about the quality of
their performance on this task, the solutions for each
floor plan were enclosed in the immediately succeeding
envelope along with the subsequent floor plan sketch.
Feedback was easily determined visually since completed
floor plans were stacked on the subjects' tables.
Within the group, task variety was manipulated.
For instance in the model assembly task, some subjects
had only to assemble a single type of model. This was
considered a low variety task. Other subjects had to
assemble five different types of vehicles(high variety
task). For the cognitive task assignment, subjects in
the low variety condition worked on floor plans for
buildings that were all the same shape(rectangular),
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but with differing dimensions. The carpet to be used in
these buildings was always sold in the same sized unit
(a 10'x20 roll). In the high variety condition, the
three rooms in the building were arranged to form shapes
other than rectangles. The units of carpet to be used
in the high variety condition also varied from one building to the next.
The four types of goal conditions created and posed
to experiment subjects were no goal, do-your-best goal,
easy goal, and difficult goal. In the no goal condition
subjects simply were told to work on the task. In the
do-your-best condition subjects were instructed to do
the best they could on the task. In the easy and difficult goal conditions subjects were given specific
numbers of models and floor plans to complete. Appropriate goals were established through a pilot study in
which subjects worked on the tasks under a no goal instruction set. Easy goals were defined as half a standard
deviation above the mean number of models/floor plans
completed by the pilot subjects. Diffi cult goals were
defined as one and a half standard deviations above
the mean. Goals were established separately for low
variety and high variety versions of each task to allow
for differences in performance due to characteristics
of the task itself.
The evaluative contexts created to heighten con-
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cern about the evaluation of performance were: (1) peer
evaluation (2) compliance evaluation, where concern
about complying to an authority who has the power to
withhold tangible rewards was set up and (3) a control
condition, where no attempt was made to heighten the
subjects concern about evaluation was also set up.
Results were as follows:
Manipulative Checks
Subjects' descriptions of the tasks on the post
test questionnaire were examined to check whether subjects perceived the manual and cognitive tasks as differing
on dimensions other than the prima facie dimension of
manual versus cognitive. Two-tailed, paired "t" tests
revealed that the manual task was perceived as somewhat
easier, less complex, more enjoyable, and more interesting.
Subjects perceived the manual task as giving them less
autonomy; the manual and cognitive tasks were perceived
as no different on the dimensions of feedback about
performance or variety.
Goal Conditions
Subjects' responses to the question on the post
test questionnaire that asked, "Did the experimenter
set a goal for you when you were doing the task?, were
analyzed using a chi-square test, which revealed strong
differneces in responses across the four goal conditions
previously stated. For both tasks, ninety-five percent
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of the subjects in the easy and difficult goal conditions
perceived that goals were set. In the do-your-best
condition, forty-two percent of the subjects perceived
that goals were set. Sixteen percent of the subjects
in the no goal condition perceived that goals were set.
Subjects who perceived a goal was set were asked to
describe the goal. Their responses were coded an nonspecific quantity and/or quality goal(e.g., do as many
as I can correctly or do-your-best) or specific quantity
(e.g., complete seven units). Looking at subjects who
perceived a goal was set, ninety-one percent of those
in the easy and difficult goal conditions correctly
described the goal set; of those in the do-your-best
condition, fifty-two percent described the goal a "doyour-best" and forty-two percent described the :goal as
non-specific quantity and/or quality. The few subjects
in the no goal condition who indicated a goal had been
set described the goal as either non-specific quantity
and/or quality or as do-your-best and so they were not
dropped from the analyses.
Evaluative Context
Compared to subjects' in the control and peer evaluation conditions, subjects in the compliance condition
were more concerned about how the experimenter would
evaluate performance of the task. A contrast was noted
when comparisons were made between the control and peer

evaluation conditions and the compliance condition which
indicated that subjects were more concerned about performance evaluation in the compliance condition.
For both cognitive and manual tasks, the main effect
of the evaluative context was elicited through the post
test question which asked how important it was whether
or not other subjects in the experiment felt one performed well. Findings revealed that subjects in the
peer evaluation condition had relatively low concern
about their peers' opinion. Moderate amounts of concern
were reported by subjects in the control and compliance
conditions.
Discussion of Analyses
The major dependent variables in this study were
conitive and manual task settings. The major independent
variables were goal, evaluative context, and task variety.
A multivariate analysis of variance(MANOVA) was used to
test the relationship between independent and dependent
variables. The results were stated in the body of the
thesis(see page 55).
The foregoing was presented to illustrate the type
of methodology that can be used to measure and study
behavioral aspects in the Walton-McKersie model.
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